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This study explores the role of investor sentiment in a broad set of anomalies in cross-sectional stock
returns.  We consider a setting where the presence of market-wide sentiment is combined with the
argument that overpricing should be more prevalent than underpricing, due to short-sale impediments.
Long-short strategies that exploit the anomalies exhibit profits consistent with this setting.  First, each
anomaly is stronger—its long-short strategy is more profitable—following high levels of sentiment.
Second, the short leg of each strategy is more profitable following high sentiment.  Finally, sentiment
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Whether investor sentiment aﬀects stock prices is a question of long-standing interest to
economists. At least as early as Keynes (1936), numerous authors have considered the pos-
sibility that a signiﬁcant presence of sentiment-driven investors can cause prices to depart
from fundamental values. The classic argument against sentiment eﬀects is that they would
be eliminated by rational traders seeking to exploit the proﬁt opportunities created by mis-
pricing. If rational traders cannot fully exploit such opportunities, however, then sentiment
eﬀects become more likely.
This study investigates the presence of sentiment eﬀects by combining two concepts
that are prominent, separately, in the related literature. The ﬁrst concept is that investor
sentiment contains a market-wide component with the potential to inﬂuence prices on many
securities in the same direction at the same time.1 The second concept, which traces to Miller
(1977), is that impediments to short selling play a signiﬁcant role in limiting the ability of
rational traders to exploit overpricing.2 As Miller argues (p. 1154),
A market with a large number of well informed investors may not have any grossly
undervalued securities, but if those investors are unwilling to sell short (as they
often are) their presence is consistent with a few investments being overvalued.
Combining Miller’s argument with the presence of market-wide sentiment replaces the “few”
overpriced investments with potentially many such investments when market-wide sentiment
is high. In contrast, periods of low market-wide sentiment, by Miller’s reasoning, should not
be accompanied by substantial underpricing.
We explore sentiment-related overpricing as at least a partial explanation for 11 asset-
pricing “anomalies” that survive adjustments for exposure to the three factors of Fama and
French (1993). These anomalies reﬂect sorts on measures that include ﬁnancial distress, net
stock issues, composite equity issues, total accruals, net operating assets, momentum, gross
1Studies addressing market-wide sentiment include Delong, Summers, Shleifer, and Waldman (1990),
Shleifer and Summers (1990), Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Shiller
(2001), Brown and Cliﬀ (2004, 2005), Yuan (2005), Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007), Kaniel, Saar, and
Titman (2006), Kumar and Lee (2006), Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), Bergman and Roychowdhury
(2008), Frazzini and Lamont (2008), Livnat and Petrovic (2008), Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan (2009), Yu
(2009), Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrahmanyam (2010), Gao, Yu, and Yuan (2010), and Yu and Yuan (2010).
2Studies that investigate the role of short-sale constraints in overpricing include Figlewski (1981), Chen,
Hong, and Stein (2002), Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), Duﬃe, Garleanu and Pedersen (2002),
Jones and Lamont (2002), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Lamont (2004), Lamont and Stein (2004), Ofek,
Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004), Nagel (2005), and Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2010).
1proﬁt-to-assets, asset growth, return-on-assets, and investment-to-assets.3 For each anomaly,
we examine the strategy that goes long the stocks in the highest-performing decile and short
those in the lowest-performing decile. We then use the market-wide investor sentiment index
constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) to explore sentiment eﬀects.
We investigate three hypotheses that result from combining the presence of market-wide
sentiment with the Miller short-sale argument. The ﬁrst hypothesis is that the anomalies,
to the extent they reﬂect mispricing, should be stronger following high sentiment. If the
primary form of mispricing is indeed overpricing, then mispricing should be more prevalent
when sentiment is high. We ﬁnd that each of the 11 anomalies is stronger following high
levels of investor sentiment (i.e., levelsof sentiment above the median value). When averaged
across anomalies, 70% of the benchmark adjusted proﬁts from a long-short strategy occur in
months following levels of investor sentiment above its median value. Time-series regressions
conﬁrm a signiﬁcant positive relation between investor sentiment and the long-short anomaly
proﬁts.
The second hypothesis is that the returns on the “short-leg” portfolio of each anomaly
should be lower when sentiment is high. The stocks in the short leg are relatively overpriced
compared to the stocks in the long leg, to the extent the anomaly reﬂects mispricing. More-
over, the stocks in the short leg should be more overpriced when sentiment is high. For
each of the 11 anomalies, we ﬁnd that the return on the short leg is lower following high
sentiment. When averaged across anomalies, 78% of the benchmark adjusted proﬁts from
shorting that leg occur in months following high sentiment. Time-series regressions conﬁrm
a signiﬁcant negative relation between investor sentiment and the returns on the short leg.
The third hypothesis is that investor sentiment should not greatly aﬀect returns on the
“long-leg” portfolio of each anomaly. If, as in the Miller argument, there is no underpricing,
then the returns on the long leg should not be higher following low sentiment than following
high sentiment. When market-wide sentiment is high, the stocks in the long leg could
be overpriced, but the long leg should contain the least degree of overpricing. Overall,
we should not expect to see sentiment playing much of a role in the long-leg returns. This
hypothesis is also conﬁrmed. None of the 11 long legs exhibit a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
high and low sentiment periods. When averaged across anomalies, the benchmark-adjusted
returns on the long leg exhibit only a 4 basis-point monthly diﬀerence between high and
low sentiment periods. Time-series regressions conﬁrm the absence of a relation between
3Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2010) report that these anomalies are especially hard to explain using
traditional asset pricing models such as the CAPM or Fama-French 3-factor model.
2benchmark-adjusted long-leg returns and investor sentiment.
Perhaps the study most closely related to ours is that of Baker and Wurgler (2006), who
argue that market-wide sentiment should exert stronger impacts on stocks that are diﬃcult
to value and hard to arbitrage. They examine returns on stocks judged most likely to possess
both characteristics, as proxied by a number of observable variables. They conclude that
market-wide sentiment is associated with cross-sectional return diﬀerencesthat are consistent
with the importance of those characteristics. A key diﬀerence between our study and theirs is
that we consider impediments to short-selling as the major obstacle to eliminating sentiment-
driven mispricing. To the extent such mispricing exists, overpricing should then be more
prevalent than underpricing, and overpricing should be more prevalent when market-wide
sentiment is high. In order to explore the presence of such mispricing eﬀects on a market-wide
basis, we examine a broad set of 11 well-documented anomalies relative to the Fama-French
three factor model. None of these anomalies are examined by Baker and Wurgler.
Another related study is Yu and Yuan (2010), who show that the correlation between
the market’s expected return and its conditional volatility is positive during low-sentiment
periods and nearly ﬂat during high-sentiment periods. Their study envisions a setting similar
in spirit to ours, in that they argue the market is less rational during high-sentiment periods,
due to higher participation by noise traders in such periods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses. Section
3 discusses the investor-sentiment data and describes returns on the long-short strategies
constructed for each of the 11 anomalies. Sections 4 reports the main empirical results.
Section 5 investigates the robustness of our results to macroeconomic eﬀects as well as the
use of an alternative sentiment index. Section 6 concludes.
2. Hypotheses
Here we develop the hypotheses used to explore mispricing as at least a partial explanation
for the broad set of anomalies we consider. Our hypothesized setting combinestwo prominent
concepts: market-wide sentiment and short-sale impediments.
For many years, researchers in ﬁnance have argued that empirical evidence supports the
notion that the beliefs of many stock-market investors include a common time-varying “senti-
ment” component that exerts market-wide eﬀects on equity prices. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler
(1991), for example, conclude that market-wide sentiment contributes to the diﬀerences be-
3tween prices of close-end funds and their net asset values. Ritter (1991) reports evidence of
long-run reversals in returns on initial public oﬀering (IPO) stocks, and he concludes that
the evidence is consistent with periodic waves of optimism that especially impact the prices
of young growth stocks.
Numerous studies have argued that there exist short-sale impediments in the stock mar-
ket, due to institutional constraints, arbitrage risk, behavioral biases of traders, and trading
costs. First, many institutional investors, such as mutual funds, are simply prohibited by
their charters from taking short positions. Second, even investors who do not face institu-
tional constraints or high shorting costs can neverthelessbe deterred by the risks in arbitrage,
as discussed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Traders who short a security in the belief that
its price is too high can be correct, in that the price will eventually fall, but they face the risk
that the price will go up before it goes down. Such a price move, requiring additional capital,
can force the traders to liquidate at a loss. A similar risk does not arise for long positions
without leverage. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) further argue that such arbitrage risk looms
particularly large for institutional managers, whose career paths depend heavily on recent
performance. Third, individual investors, due to limited knowledge or behavioral biases, are
reluctant to take short positions. For example, Barber and Odean (2008) document that
only 0.29% of positions of individual investors are short positions. Finally, shorting can be
costly. D’Avolio (2002), for example, ﬁnds that many stocks are costly to short due to low
supplies of stock loans from institutional investors.
Miller (1977) argues that, with short-sale impediments, overpricingshould be more preva-
lent than underpricing. Investors with the most optimistic views about a stock, relative to
the views of other investors, will exert the greatest eﬀect on the stock’s price, since their
views are not counterbalanced by the valuations of the relatively less optimistic investors.
The latter investors are inclined to take no position if they view the stock as undervalued,
rather than take a short position. When the most optimistic investors are too optimistic and
overvalue the stock, overpricing results. In contrast, underpricing is less likely: as long as the
cross-section of views includes the view of rational investors, the most optimistic investors
do not undervalue the stock.
Combining market-wide sentiment with Miller’s argument about the eﬀect of short-sale
impediments leads to our hypotheses. During periods of high market-wide sentiment, the
most optimistic views about many stocks tend to be overly optimistic, and many stocks
tend to be overpriced. During low-sentiment periods, the most optimistic views about many
stocks tend to be those of the rational investors, and thus mispricing during those periods
4is less likely. Therefore, mispricing is more likely during high-sentiment periods than during
low-sentiment periods. We examine 11 diﬀerent anomalies. If each of these anomalies at
least partially reﬂects mispricing, we then arrive at our ﬁrst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The anomalies should be stronger following high investor sentiment.
Consider a long-short strategy whose positive average proﬁt reﬂects the unexplained
cross-sectional diﬀerence in average returns constituting an “anomaly.” To the extent that
an anomaly represents mispricing, the proﬁts of the long-short strategy can reﬂect relatively
greater overpricing of stocks in the short leg, relatively greater underpricing of stocks in the
long leg, or both. In our hypothesized setting, overpricing should be the prevalent form of
mispricing, so the proﬁts of the long-short strategy should arise primarily from overpricing
of stocks in the short leg. Since overpricing should be greater during high-sentiment periods,
we arrive at our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The short legs of the long-short strategies should have lower returns (greater
proﬁts) following high investor sentiment.
The stocks in the long leg are unlikely to be underpriced in our simple scenario. They
could be overpriced, and overpricing would be more likely when sentiment is high. If the
anomaly’s sorting variable is related to mispricing, however, the overpricing of the stocks in
the long leg should be the smallest in the cross-section. Taking this reasoning to its limit,
we entertain the possibility that any sentiment-related overpricing of the long-leg stocks is
minimal. We thus arrive at our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The long legs of the long-short strategies should have similar returns fol-
lowing high and low investor sentiment.
It is useful to clarify in our setting the role of cross-sectional dispersion in investors’ views.
Arguing that underpricing is unlikely requires the view of rational investors to lie within the
cross-section of views across all investors. When sentiment is low, investors’ views must be
suﬃciently disperse to include rational valuations, even if the latter views are then the most
optimistic views. To that extent, cross-sectional dispersion of views is a necessary ingredient
of our hypothesized setting.
Our setting does not assign a role for variation over time in the cross-sectional dispersion
of views. We simply assume that the views of the most optimistic investors in the cross-
section are more likely to be too optimistic when our empirical measure of investor sentiment
is high than when it is low. There are various ways that can happen. As our sentiment
5measure increases, the cross-sectional mean of investors’ views can remain close to a rational
valuation level while the cross-sectional dispersion of views increases. Alternatively, as our
sentiment measure increases, the dispersion of views can remain relatively constant, or even
decline, while the mean of investors’ views increases signiﬁcantly above a rational valuation
level. Distinguishing among such scenarios is beyond the scope of our study.
3. Data: Investor sentiment and anomalies
3.1. Investor Sentiment
We measure investor sentiment using the monthly market-based sentiment series constructed
by Baker and Wurgler (2006). The index spans over 42 years, from July 1965 to December
2007. Baker and Wurgler (2006) form their composite sentiment index by taking the ﬁrst
principal component of six measures of investor sentiment. The principal component analysis
ﬁlters out idiosyncratic noise in the six measures and captures their common component.
The six measures are the closed-end fund discount, the number and the ﬁrst-day returns of
IPO’s, NYSE turnover, the equity share in total new issues, and the dividend premium.
The BW sentiment index is plotted in Figure 1. It appears to capture most anecdotal
accounts of ﬂuctuations in sentiment. Immediately after the 1961 crash of growth stocks,
investor sentiment was low but rose to a subsequent peak in the 1968 and 1969 “Electronics
Bubble.” Sentiment fell again by the mid-1970s, but it picked up and reached a peak in the
“Biotech Bubble” of the early 1980s. In the late 1980s, sentiment dropped but rose again in
the early 1990s, reaching its most recent peak during the “Internet Bubble.”
3.2. Anomalies
We explore previously documented diﬀerences in cross-sectional average returns that survive
adjustment for exposures to the three factors deﬁned by Fama and French (1993). Using
the Fama-French model as the benchmark against which to deﬁne the set of “anomalies”
imposes a higher hurdle than the single-factor CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965)
while still providing a broad set. With the CAPM as the benchmark, the set of documented
anomalies would expand to an unmanageable size.
We consider 11 well-documented anomalies:
61 and 2: Financial Distress
Financial distress is often invoked to explain otherwise anomalous patterns in the cross-
section of stock returns. However, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2007) ﬁnd that ﬁrms
with high failure probability have lower rather than higher subsequent returns (anomaly
1). Campbell et al. suggest that their ﬁnding is a challenge to standard models of rational
asset pricing. Using Ohlson’s (1980) O-score as the distress measure yields similar results
(anomaly 2).
3 and 4: Net Stock Issues and Composite Equity Issues
The stock issuing market has been long viewed as producing an anomaly arising from
sentiment-driven mispricing: smart managers issue shares when sentiment-driven traders
push prices to overvalued levels. Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) show that, in
post-issue years, equity issuers underperform matching nonissuers with similar characteristics
(anomaly 3). Daniel and Titman (2006) study an alternative measure, composite equity
issuance, deﬁned as the amount of equity a ﬁrm issues (or retires) in exchange for cash
or services. Under this measure, seasoned issues and share-based acquisitions increase the
issuance measure, while repurchases and dividends reduce this issuance measure. They also
ﬁnd that issuers underperform nonissuers (anomaly 4).
5: Total Accruals
Sloan (1996) shows that ﬁrms with high accruals earn abnormal lower returns on average
than ﬁrms with low accruals, and suggests that investors overestimate the persistence of the
accrual component of earnings when forming earnings expectations.
6: Net Operating Assets
Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004) ﬁnd that net operating assets scaled by total
assets is a strong negative predictor of long-run stock returns. They suggest that investors
with limited attention tend to focus on accounting proﬁtability, neglecting information about
cash proﬁtability, in which case net operating assets, measured as the cumulative diﬀerence
between operating income and free cash ﬂow, captures such a bias.
7: Momentum
The momentum eﬀect, discovered by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), is one of the most
robust anomalies in asset pricing. It refers to the phenomenon that high past recent recent
returns forecast high future returns. In a contemporaneous study, Antoniou, Doukas, and
7Subrahmanyam (2010) ﬁnd that the momentum eﬀect is stronger when sentiment is high, and
they suggest this result is consistent with the slow spread of bad news during high-sentiment
periods.
8: Gross Proﬁtability Premium
Novy-Marx (2010) discoversthat sorting on gross-proﬁt-to-assets createsabnormal benchmark-
adjusted returns, with more proﬁtable ﬁrms having higher returns than less proﬁtable ones.
9: Asset Growth
Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) ﬁnd companies that grow their total asset more earn
lower subsequent returns. They suggest that this phenomenon is due to investors’ initial
overreaction to changes in future business prospects implied by asset expansions.
10: Return on Assets
Fama and French (2006) ﬁnd that more proﬁtable ﬁrms have higher expected returns than
less proﬁtable ﬁrms. Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2010) show that ﬁrms with higher past
return-on-assets earn abnormally higher subsequent returns. Wang and Yu (2010) ﬁnd that
the anomaly exists primarily among ﬁrms with high arbitrage costs and high information
uncertainty, suggesting that mispricing is a culprit.
11: Investment-to-Assets
Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and Xing (2008) show that higher past investment predicts
abnormally lower future returns. Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) attribute this anomaly to
investors’ initial underreactions to the overinvestment caused by managers’ empire-building
behavior.
As noted earlier, deﬁning anomalies with respect to the CAPM, using just a single market
benchmark instead of the three Fama-French benchmarks, would add substantially more
anomalies. Chief among them would be the two additional Fama-French factors: the return
spread between small and large ﬁrms (SMB)—the “size” factor—and the return spread
between ﬁrms with high and low book-to-market ratios (HML)—the “value” factor. Baker
and Wurgler (2006) document signiﬁcant eﬀects of investor sentiment on both the size and
value factors. They ﬁnd that, when sentiment is high, subsequent returns are low on stocks
judged harder for investors to price: small stocks as well as on stocks at both extremes
of the value-growth spectrum. If the size and value factors are viewed as anomalies that
reﬂect only mispricing, then the Baker-Wurgler results would appear to be inconsistent with
8our basic story that anomalies are stronger following high sentiment. For example, the
size factor, which takes a long position in small stocks, is actually weaker following high
sentiment. Many researchers have argued, however, that the size and value factors are not
solely the result of mispricing but instead reﬂect priced systematic risks not captured by the
CAPM. If we were to entertain the size and value factors as being part mispricing and part
risk compensation, our sentiment story would apply to the “anomalous” mispricing part.
Without a model to separate the two parts, however, extending our analysis to the size and
value factors seems diﬃcult.
3.3. Long-short strategies
For each of the 11 anomalies, we obtain value-weighted portfolio returns within each decile
of the anomaly’s sorting variable. We then construct a long-short strategy using the extreme
deciles, 1 and 10, with the long leg being the higher-performing decile(as reported by previous
studies and conﬁrmed in our sample period). For all but one of the anomalies, our decile
portfolio returns are also used in Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2010).4 For the remaining
anomaly—gross proﬁt to assets—we construct portfolios following the procedure in Novy-
Marx (2010). We also construct a “combination” strategy that takes equal positions across
the long-short strategies constructed in any given month. Most of the portfolio returns
cover the period from August 1965 through January 2008. Due to more stringent data
requirements, the portfolios sorted by O-score (anomaly 2) and ROA (anomaly 10) are
available beginning in January 1972, while the failure-probability portfolios (anomaly 1)
start in December 1974.
Table 1 reports properties of monthly returns on the long-short strategies across all
months in our sample period. Panel A reports correlations among the long-short return
spreads. Overall, the strategies are not highly correlated with each other. For the 11 individ-
ual strategies, the percentages of overall variance explained by each of the ﬁrst ﬁve principal
components are [32.3, 20.2, 8.9, 8.3, 8.0], and even the last principal component still explains
2.0 percent. Of the 11 strategies, the ﬁrst one listed—Failure Probability—exhibits the high-
est correlations with the other strategies, and its correlation with the combination strategy
is 0.83. The asset-growth and investment/assets strategies exhibit the lowest correlations
with the other strategies, although their correlation with each other is 0.61.
Panel B of Table 1 reports averages and accompanying t-statistics for the excess monthly
4We thank Long Chen for providing these data.
9returns (returns in excess of the monthly Treasury bill rate) on the long and short legs of
each strategy as well as the long/short return spreads. Panel C reports the corresponding
values for “benchmark-adjusted” returns, which in this study we deﬁne as returns net of
what is attributable to exposures to the market, size, and value factors constructed by Fama
and French (1993): the excess return on the stock market (MKT), a return spread between
small and large ﬁrms (SMB), and a return spread between stocks with high and low book-
to-market ratios(HML).5 That is, the benchmark-adjusted average return on a strategy is
the estimate of ai in the regression,
Ri,t = ai + bMKTt + cSMBt + dHMLt + ￿i,t. (1)
where Ri,t is the strategy’s excess return in month t. All 11 of the long/short strategies
produce signiﬁcant positive average return spreads in both panels B and C—consistent with
their being identiﬁed as “anomalies” for this study. The average benchmark-adjusted return
spread for the combined strategy is 87 basis points (bp) per month, with the individual
strategies ranging from 43 bp (composite equity issues) to 177 bp (momentum).
4. Empirical analysis: Sentiment and returns
4.1. Average returns: Low versus high sentiment
We ﬁrst classify returns each month as following either a high-sentiment month or a low-
sentiment month. A high-sentiment month is one in which the value of the BW sentiment
index in the previous month is above the median value for the sample period, while the low-
sentiment months are those with below-median values. We then compute average returns
separately for the high- and low-sentiment months. Table 2 reports results for excess returns,
while Table 3 reports results for returns adjusted by the three Fama-French benchmarks.6
First consider Hypothesis 1, which predicts that the anomalies should be stronger fol-
lowing high sentiment than following low sentiment. Tables 2 and 3 reveal that each of
the long-short spreads exhibits higher average proﬁts following high sentiment: all of the
values in the last column of each table are positive. In Table 2, the t-statistics for 8 of the
11 anomalies reject, at a 0.05 signiﬁcance level, the null hypothesis of no sentiment-related
diﬀerence in favor of the (one-sided) alternative represented by Hypothesis 1. The combined
5We thank Ken French for supplying updated series of these factors.
6The Appendix reports, in Table A1, results based on returns adjusted for just a single market benchmark,
instead of the three Fama-French benchmarks. All conclusions are very similar.
10long-short spread earns 93 bp more per month following high sentiment, with a t-statistic
equal to 4.25. In Table 3, with benchmark-adjustment returns, 7 of the 11 individual t-
statistics reject the null in favor of Hypothesis 1, and the combined long-short spread earns
70 bp more per month following high-sentiment (t-statistic: 3.74). In Table 2, the long/short
proﬁts on the combined strategy in high-sentiment months account for 80% of that strategy’s
proﬁts earned across all months. In Table 3, the corresponding share is 70%. Overall, the
results in Tables 2 and 3 provide strong support for Hypothesis 1.
Next consider Hypothesis 2, which predicts that average returns on the short leg should
be signiﬁcantly lower following high sentiment than following low sentiment. The support for
this hypothesis is especially strong. In both Tables 2 and 3, the short legs of all 11 anomaly
strategies have a lower average return following high sentiment, and 10 of them have t-
statistics that reject the no-diﬀerence null in favor of Hypothesis 2 at a 0.05 signiﬁcance level.
In Table 2, based on excess returns, the short leg of the combined strategy earns 132 bp less
per month following high sentiment (t-statistic: -2.41) than following low sentiment. The
short leg of that strategy actually earns a negative average excess return of -68 bp per month
following high sentiment (t-statistic: -1.54). In contrast, the same short leg earns a positive
average excess return of 65 bp following low-sentiment. We see in Table 3 that adjusting
for benchmark exposure shrinks the diﬀerences between high- and low-sentiment returns on
the short leg, as compared to the excess returns reported in Table 2. Nevertheless, in Table
3, the diﬀerence for the combined strategy is still 66 bp per month (t-statistic: −3.89), and
78% of the short-leg proﬁts across all months occur in the months following high sentiment.
The evidence in Tables 2 and 3 appears to support an inference that sentiment-driven
overpricing is at least a partial explanation for all of the anomalies analyzed here. The
anomalies are stronger following high investor sentiment (Hypothesis 1), and the short legs
are substantially more proﬁtable in months following high sentiment (Hypothesis 2), to the
extent that the short-leg portfolios in those months even return less on average than the
T-bill rate.
Finally, consider Hypothesis 3, which predicts that sentiment should not have an ap-
preciable eﬀect on the long-leg returns. If underpricing driven by market-wide sentiment
makes a signiﬁcant contribution to the proﬁtability of the long legs of the anomaly strate-
gies, there should be greater underpricing, and hence higher long-leg returns, following low
sentiment. Alternatively, higher long-leg returns following low sentiment could also reﬂect
overpricing of long-leg stocks during high-sentiment periods, despite those stocks’ being in
the decile of highest overall performance. We don’t see much evidence of either scenario.
11In Table 2, the long legs do have higher returns following low sentiment, but only 1 of the
11 anomalies (investment/assets) has a t-statistic that rejects the no-diﬀerence null in favor
of that alternative. The long leg of the combined strategy earns 39 bp less following high
sentiment, but the t-statistic is only -0.93. Any evidence for sentiment eﬀects on the long
leg become even weaker after benchmark adjustment. In Table 3, none of the t-statistics
reject the no-diﬀerence null in favor of higher returns following low sentiment. In fact, 8 of
the 11 diﬀerences go in the opposite direction, although only 1 anomaly (net stock issues)
has a signiﬁcant one-tailed t-statistic (1.69). The benchmark-adjusted return on the long leg
of the combined strategy exhibits only a 4 bp diﬀerence between high- and low-sentiment
periods. Overall, the evidence in Tables 2 and 3 appears to be consistent with Hypothesis 3
as well.
4.2. Predictive regressions
The results reported above are obtained by averaging within high-sentiment versus low-
sentiment months, where the high/low classiﬁcation is simply a binary measure. Here we
conduct an alternative analysis, using predictive regressions to investigate whether the level
of the BW sentiment index predicts returns in ways consistent with our hypotheses. Table
4 reports of results of regressing excess returns on just the lagged sentiment index. Table
5 reports results of regressing excess returns on the lagged sentiment index as well as the
contemporaneous returns on the three Fama-French factors.7 The latter regression thus
investigates the ability of sentiment to predict benchmark-adjusted returns.
Hypothesis 1—anomalies are stronger following high sentiment—predicts a positive rela-
tion between the proﬁtability of each long-short spread and investor sentiment. Consistent
with this prediction, the slope coeﬃcients for the spreads of all 11 anomalies are positive in
both Tables 4 and 5. In Table 4, 9 of the individual t-statistics are signiﬁcant at a one-tailed
0.05 signiﬁcance level, while 8 are signiﬁcant in Table 5. The combination strategy has a t-
statistic of 3.79 in Table 4 and 2.98 in Table 5. Returns are measured in percent per month,
and the sentiment index is scaled to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. Thus,
for example, the slope coeﬃcient of 0.50 for the combination strategy indicates that a one-
standard-deviation increase in sentiment is associated with $0.005 of additional long-short
monthly proﬁt on a strategy with $1 in each leg of the spread.
7The Appendix reports, in Table A2, results based on regressing excess returns on the lagged sentiment
index and just the single market factor, instead of the three Fama-French factors. The conclusions are very
similar.
12Hypothesis 2—greater short-leg proﬁts following high sentiment—predicts a negative
relation between the returns on the short-leg portfolio and the lagged sentiment level. Con-
sistent with this prediction, the slope coeﬃcients for the short-leg returns of all 11 anomalies
are negative in both Tables 4 and 5. In Table 4, all 11 individual t-statistics are signiﬁcant,
while 8 are signiﬁcant in Table 5. The combination strategy has a t-statistic of -2.90 in Table
4 and -3.01 in Table 5. In Table 4, we see that a one-standard-deviation increase in senti-
ment is associated with nearly a one percent lower monthly excess return on the short-leg
portfolio.
Hypothesis 3 predicts no signiﬁcant relation between returns on the long-leg and lagged
sentiment. Here, for essentially the ﬁrst time, we see that benchmark adjustment makes a
noticeable diﬀerence. In Table 4, which is based simply on excess returns without benchmark
adjustment, the coeﬃcients for the long-leg returns are all negative, and 5 of the 11 are sig-
niﬁcant at an 0.05 signiﬁcance level for a one-tailed test—appropriate against an alternative
of sentiment-related mispricing. The combination strategy in Table 4 has a slope of -0.43,
which is only half the magnitude for the short leg but is nevertheless signiﬁcant (t-statistic:
-1.85). After adjusting for benchmark exposures, however, we see results that essentially fall
right in line with Hypothesis 3. In Table 5, which is based on returns adjusted for exposures
to the Fama-French benchmarks, 7 of the 11 long-leg slopes are positive, none signiﬁcantly,
and only 1 of the negative slopes is signiﬁcant. The combination strategy in Table 5 has a
zero slope (to two decimal places) and a t-statistic of 0.15, giving a result that could not be
closer to the prediction of Hypothesis 3.
In sum, results from the predictive regressions reported in Tables 4 and 5 deliver the same
message as the comparisons of high- and low-sentiment periods in Tables 2 and 3. The data
support a scenario in which market-wide sentiment creates overpricing, due to short-sale
limitations. Sentiment-driven overpricing appears to be at least a partial explanation for the
broad set of anomalies examined here.
We should also note that the potential bias in predictive regressions, as analyzed by
Stambaugh (1999), appears not to be a problem in the results reported. The correlations
between the predictive-regression residuals and the innovations in sentiment level obtained
from a ﬁrst-order autoregression are small. Applying Stambaugh’s bias correction to the
reported slopes in Table 4, for example, produces only small changes in the second decimal
place of some of the coeﬃcients and no changes to the others.
135. Robustness
5.1. Controlling additional macro variables
One might be inclined to seek a risk-based explanation of our results, as an alternative
to sentiment-driven overpricing. One risk-based explanation would involve an omitted risk
factor to which each short leg is sensitive but each long leg is not. If the premium on that risk
factor then varies over time in a manner correlated with our sentiment index, our results could
obtain. Explaining why, across the 11 anomalies, there would be such diﬀerences in loadings
between long and short legs presents a challenge. Even if such diﬀerences exist, however,
there would remain the question of whether the omitted risk factor’s premium exhibits the
required correlation with sentiment. It seems reasonable to expect that variations in any
risk premium would be correlated with some aspect of macroeconomic conditions.
Baker and Wurgler (2006) remove macro-related variation from their sentiment index by
regressing raw sentiment measures on six macro variables: the growth in industrial produc-
tion, the growth in durable, nondurable, and services consumption, the growth in employ-
ment, and a ﬂag for NBER recessions. To assess the potential for a risk-based explanation
of our results, we control for an additional set of macro-related variables that seem reason-
able to entertain as being correlated with a risk premium: the default premium, the term
premium, the real interest rate, the inﬂation rate, and CAY. The default premium is deﬁned
as the yield spread between BAA and AAA bonds, and the term premium is deﬁned as the
spread between 20-year and 1-year Treasuries. The real interest rate is deﬁned as the most
recent monthly diﬀerence between the 30-day T-bill return and the CPI inﬂation rate. Cay
is the consumption-wealth variable deﬁned in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001).8
Table 6 reports the results of regressing excess returns on the lagged sentiment in-
dex, the contemporaneous returns on the three Fama-French factors, and the ﬁve lagged
macro-related variables. Thus, we investigate whether the ability of sentiment to predict
benchmark-adjusted returns is robust to including macro-related ﬂuctuations in addition to
those already controlled for by Baker and Wurgler. The eﬀects of investor sentiment re-
main largely unchanged by including the additional ﬁve variables: the coeﬃcients and their
t statistics are close to those in Table 5, in which the additional macro-related variables are
not included.
8The bond yields are obtained from the St. Louis Federal Reserve, the T-bill return and inﬂation are
obtained from CRSP, and Cay is obtained from Sydney Ludvigson’s website.
14In sum, if an unnamed risk factor indeed drives our results, it seems the variation over
time in its premium must not be strongly related to either the six macro variables used
by Baker and Wurgler or the ﬁve additional variables included in our analysis. Of course,
even if such a factor does exist, there remains the challenge of explaining why, across the 11
anomalies, the short legs are sensitive to this factor while the long legs are not.
5.2. Alternative sentiment measures
We also investigate the robustness of our results to using an alternative sentiment index. A
number of investor-sentiment studies use the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment
Index (e.g. Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008)). While
the Baker-Wurgler index is a measure of sentiment based on stock-market indicators, the
Michigan sentiment index is a survey-based measure. The monthly survey is mailed to a
random set of 500 households and asks their views about the economy. To remove macro-
related information from the index, we follow a similar approach to Baker and Wurgler
(2006). Speciﬁcally, we take the residuals from a regression of the Michigan index on the six
macro-related variables used by Baker and Wurgler.9
Table 7 reports the results of regressing excess returns on the lagged Michigan sentiment
index (adjusted as above) as well as the contemporaneous returns on the three Fama-French
factors. Our three hypotheses are supported with the Michigan index as a proxy for senti-
ment. For the combination strategy of the 11 anomalies, the long-short proﬁt is signiﬁcantly
higher following higher sentiment (Hypothesis 1), the short leg has lower returns following
higher sentiment (Hypothesis 2), and sentiment exhibits no signiﬁcant ability to predict the
long-leg returns (Hypothesis 3). The patterns of the results across the 11 individual anoma-
lies are also similar to those obtained using the Baker-Wurgler index, as reported in Table
5, although some of them are weaker.10
6. Conclusions
With impediments to short selling, overpricing becomes more diﬃcult to eliminate, so a
ﬁrm’s stock price can reﬂect the views of investors who are too optimistic. With market-
9The results are essentially the same if we also include the ﬁve additional macro variables discussed above.
10In unreported results, we repeat the same analysis using the Conference Board Consumer Conﬁdence
Index as a proxy for sentiment, and the results are largely the same as obtained using the Michigan sentiment
index. The results can be provided upon the request.
15wide variations in investor sentiment, such overpricing can occur for many stocks during
periods of high sentiment.
Long-short strategies for a set of 11 anomalies in cross-sectional returns exhibit empir-
ical properties consistent with a combination of short-sale impediments and market-wide
sentiment. Since overpricing is more likely than underpricing in our hypothesized setting,
anomalies should be stronger following periods of high sentiment, to the extent that the
anomalies reﬂect mispricing. We indeed ﬁnd greater proﬁtability of the long-short strate-
gies following high sentiment. If overpricing is the primary source of those greater proﬁts,
the short legs of the strategies should be more proﬁtable following high sentiment, and we
also ﬁnd that implication to be supported strongly by the data. Sentiment does not ex-
hibit a signiﬁcant eﬀect on proﬁts from the long legs of the strategies. The latter result is
also consistent with the prediction that underpricing should be less prevalent in our simple
setting where short-sale impediments present the key obstacle to traders seeking to exploit
mispricing.
This study does not aim to ﬁnd complete explanations for each of the anomalies con-
sidered. Numerous studies have examined the individual anomalies in more detail and have
provided more speciﬁcally focused contexts and interpretations. We paint the set of anoma-
lies with an intentionally broad brush, given our objective to consider the implications when
market-wide sentiment interacts with short-sale impediments. While this approach reveals
novel evidence consistent with overpricing as at least a partial explanation for many anoma-
lies, there is certainly more work ahead in order to develop a richer understanding of how
sentiment plays a role in pricing ﬁnancial assets.


















Figure 1. The investor sentiment index from 1965:07 to 2007:12. The sentiment index is
the ﬁrst principal component of six measures. The six measures are the closed-end fund discount,
NYSE share turnover, the number of and the average of ﬁrst-day returns on initial public oﬀerings
(IPOs), the equity share in new issues, and the dividend premium. To control for macro conditions,
the six raw sentiment measures are regressed on the growth of industrial production, the growth of
durable consumption, the growth of nondurable consumption, the growth of service consumption,
the growth of employment, and a dummy variable for National Burean of Economic Research
(NBER) recessions.
17Table 1
Anomaly Returns Across All Months
The table reports properties of returns across all months for the 11 anomalies and an equal combination of them. The
sample period is from 1965:8 to 2008:1 for all but anomaly (1), whose data begin 1974:12, and anomalies (2) and (10), whose
data begin 1972:1. The correlation matrix in Panel A is computed using the unequal-length series, applying the method in
Stambaugh (1997). The benchmark-adjusted average returns in Panel C are estimates of ai in the regression,
Ri,t = ai + bMKTt + cSMBt + dHMLt + ￿i,t,
where Ri,t is a strategy’s excess return in month t. All t-statistics are based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors of White (1980).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
A. Correlations: Long minus short
(1) Failure probability 1.00
(2) Ohlson’s O (distress) 0.64 1.00
(3) Net stock issues 0.44 0.38 1.00
(4) Comp. equity issues 0.40 0.32 0.59 1.00
(5) Total accruals 0.28 0.19 0.26 0.25 1.00
(6) Net operating assets 0.20 0.28 0.30 0.20 0.30 1.00
(7) Momentum 0.53 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.16 0.17 1.00
(8) Gross proﬁtability 0.28 0.28 0.12 -0.07 -0.14 0.14 0.20 1.00
(9) Asset growth 0.07 -0.10 0.37 0.33 0.25 0.28 0.13 -0.16 1.00
(10) Return on assets 0.67 0.62 0.32 0.21 0.12 0.14 0.31 0.35 -0.08 1.00
(11) Investment/assets 0.04 -0.05 0.26 0.25 0.36 0.28 0.06 -0.19 0.61 -0.08 1.00
(12) Combination 0.83 0.66 0.65 0.58 0.47 0.48 0.61 0.32 0.37 0.66 0.33 1.00
B. Excess Returns
Means
Long leg 0.94 0.51 0.70 0.62 0.72 0.71 1.11 0.69 1.00 0.64 0.91 0.76
Short leg -0.01 -0.19 0.07 0.20 0.13 0.06 -0.45 0.29 0.04 -0.34 0.15 -0.01
Long minus short 0.95 0.70 0.63 0.42 0.58 0.65 1.56 0.40 0.96 0.98 0.75 0.77
t-statistics
Long leg 3.97 2.18 3.66 3.47 2.54 2.98 3.81 3.20 3.82 2.56 3.65 3.57
Short leg -0.01 -0.51 0.27 0.79 0.40 0.22 -1.23 1.33 0.14 -0.88 0.57 -0.05
Long minus short 2.55 2.83 5.11 2.59 3.11 4.41 5.45 2.45 5.34 3.53 5.22 6.91
C. Benchmark-Adjusted Returns
Means
Long leg 0.39 0.21 0.20 0.02 0.26 0.25 0.63 0.43 0.22 0.38 0.17 0.28
Short leg -1.16 -0.93 -0.46 -0.41 -0.34 -0.51 -1.14 -0.23 -0.44 -0.90 -0.37 -0.60
Long minus short 1.55 1.13 0.66 0.43 0.61 0.76 1.77 0.66 0.66 1.28 0.54 0.87
t-statistics
Long leg 3.39 3.37 3.87 0.29 1.85 2.27 4.95 4.42 1.76 4.40 1.59 7.66
Short leg -4.53 -6.17 -4.62 -3.85 -2.24 -4.75 -5.11 -2.19 -3.93 -4.29 -3.30 -7.07
Long minus short 5.00 7.13 5.96 3.18 3.09 4.98 5.82 4.30 3.94 5.48 3.78 9.38
18Table 2
Anomalies During Periods of High and Low Investor Sentiment:
Excess Returns on Long-Short Strategies
The table reports average returns in excess of the one-month T-bill in months following high and low levels
of investor sentiment, as classiﬁed based on the median level of the index of Baker and Wurgler (2006). Also
reported are returns on a strategy that equally combines the strategies available within a given month. The
sample period is from 1965:8 to 2008:1 for all but anomaly (1), whose data begin 1974:12, and anomalies (2)
and (10), whose data begin 1972:1. All t-statistics are based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors of White (1980).
Long Leg Short Leg Long − Short
High Low High High Low High High Low High
Sent. Sent. −Low Sent. Sent. −Low Sent. Sent. −Low
Failure probability 0.77 1.14 -0.38 -1.10 1.25 -2.34 1.86 -0.10 1.96
(2.16) (3.74) (-0.81) (-1.54) (2.26) (-2.60) (3.25) (-0.24) (2.72)
Ohlson’s O (distress) 0.42 0.61 -0.19 -0.98 0.61 -1.59 1.40 -0.00 1.40
(1.14) (2.06) (-0.41) (-1.69) (1.33) (-2.15) (3.81) (-0.01) (2.85)
Net stock issues 0.64 0.75 -0.11 -0.50 0.63 -1.13 1.14 0.12 1.02
(2.22) (3.04) (-0.28) (-1.26) (2.10) (-2.28) (5.71) (0.88) (4.20)
Comp. equity issues 0.53 0.72 -0.19 -0.28 0.69 -0.97 0.81 0.02 0.79
(1.93) (3.08) (-0.52) (-0.72) (2.13) (-1.91) (3.19) (0.13) (2.46)
Total accruals 0.37 1.07 -0.71 -0.57 0.84 -1.41 0.94 0.23 0.70
(0.82) (3.10) (-1.25) (-1.06) (2.22) (-2.14) (3.11) (1.04) (1.88)
Net operating assets 0.50 0.92 -0.43 -0.57 0.69 -1.26 1.07 0.24 0.83
(1.36) (3.01) (-0.90) (-1.37) (2.20) (-2.41) (4.66) (1.29) (2.84)
Momentum 0.78 1.43 -0.64 -1.24 0.34 -1.58 2.03 1.09 0.93
(1.69) (4.12) (-1.11) (-2.14) (0.76) (-2.16) (4.49) (3.12) (1.64)
Gross proﬁtability 0.59 0.79 -0.20 -0.06 0.64 -0.70 0.65 0.15 0.50
(1.84) (2.73) (-0.47) (-0.18) (2.48) (-1.62) (2.93) (0.64) (1.53)
Asset growth 0.79 1.22 -0.43 -0.60 0.68 -1.27 1.39 0.54 0.85
(2.14) (3.26) (-0.81) (-1.30) (1.92) (-2.20) (5.04) (2.34) (2.37)
Return on assets 0.61 0.66 -0.05 -1.10 0.44 -1.55 1.72 0.22 1.50
(1.60) (2.10) (-0.10) (-1.78) (1.00) (-2.02) (4.01) (0.65) (2.74)
Investment/assets 0.44 1.38 -0.94 -0.47 0.78 -1.25 0.91 0.60 0.30
(1.19) (4.13) (-1.90) (-1.14) (2.25) (-2.32) (4.48) (2.93) (1.06)
Combination 0.56 0.95 -0.39 -0.68 0.65 -1.32 1.23 0.31 0.93
(1.72) (3.51) (-0.93) (-1.54) (1.96) (-2.41) (6.64) (2.64) (4.25)
19Table 3
Anomalies During Periods of High and Low Investor Sentiment:
Benchmark-Adjusted Returns on Long-Short Strategies
The table reports average benchmark-adjusted returns following high and low levels of investor sentiment, as
classiﬁed based on the median level of the index of Baker and Wurgler (2006). The average returns in high-
and low-sentiment periods are estimates of aH and aL in the regression,
Ri,t = aHdH,t + aLdL,t + bMKTt + cSMBt + dHMLt + ￿i,t,
where dH,t and dL,t are dummy variables indicating high- and low-sentiment periods, and Ri,t is the excess
return in month t on either the long leg, the short leg, or the diﬀerence. Also reported are returns on a
strategy that equally combines the strategies available within a given month. The sample period is from
1965:8 to 2008:1 for all but anomaly (1), whose data begin 1974:12, and anomalies (2) and (10), whose data
begin 1972:1. All t-statistics are based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of White (1980).
Long Leg Short Leg Long − Short
High Low High High Low High High Low High
Sent. Sent. −Low Sent. Sent. −Low Sent. Sent. −Low
Failure probability 0.43 0.33 0.10 -1.65 -0.58 -1.07 2.08 0.91 1.17
(2.52) (2.33) (0.44) (-4.33) (-1.81) (-2.19) (4.45) (2.39) (1.95)
Ohlson’s O (distress) 0.25 0.16 0.09 -1.24 -0.60 -0.64 1.49 0.76 0.73
(2.70) (2.09) (0.72) (-5.29) (-3.23) (-2.16) (6.13) (3.77) (2.32)
Net stock issues 0.28 0.11 0.17 -0.80 -0.12 -0.68 1.08 0.23 0.85
(3.68) (1.68) (1.69) (-4.86) (-1.09) (-3.42) (6.19) (1.79) (3.90)
Comp. equity issues 0.08 -0.03 0.11 -0.64 -0.17 -0.47 0.72 0.14 0.58
(0.69) (-0.31) (0.72) (-3.62) (-1.57) (-2.26) (3.40) (0.89) (2.23)
Total accruals 0.19 0.34 -0.14 -0.70 0.02 -0.73 0.89 0.31 0.58
(0.85) (2.13) (-0.53) (-2.88) (0.15) (-2.53) (3.02) (1.33) (1.60)
Net operating assets 0.22 0.27 -0.05 -0.87 -0.15 -0.72 1.09 0.42 0.67
(1.36) (2.04) (-0.24) (-4.94) (-1.25) (-3.40) (4.78) (2.20) (2.30)
Momentum 0.66 0.60 0.06 -1.51 -0.76 -0.75 2.17 1.36 0.81
(3.64) (3.46) (0.23) (-4.03) (-3.22) (-1.69) (4.46) (3.87) (1.35)
Gross proﬁtability 0.46 0.41 0.05 -0.40 -0.06 -0.33 0.85 0.47 0.38
(3.17) (3.25) (0.26) (-2.43) (-0.47) (-1.59) (3.77) (2.23) (1.24)
Asset growth 0.37 0.07 0.30 -0.82 -0.06 -0.76 1.18 0.13 1.05
(2.23) (0.38) (1.29) (-4.48) (-0.48) (-3.43) (4.81) (0.60) (3.35)
Return on assets 0.49 0.27 0.23 -1.26 -0.51 -0.75 1.75 0.78 0.97
(4.01) (2.26) (1.35) (-3.98) (-2.01) (-1.88) (5.00) (2.66) (2.16)
Investment/assets 0.01 0.32 -0.31 -0.73 -0.01 -0.72 0.74 0.33 0.41
(0.09) (2.53) (-1.57) (-4.31) (-0.07) (-3.34) (3.75) (1.76) (1.54)
Combination 0.30 0.26 0.04 -0.92 -0.26 -0.66 1.22 0.52 0.70
(5.62) (5.40) (0.62) (-6.46) (-2.95) (-3.89) (7.92) (5.01) (3.74)
20Table 4
Investor Sentiment and Anomalies: Predictive Regressions for
Excess Returns on Long-Short Strategies
The table reports estimates of b in the regression,
Ri,t = a + bSt−1 + ut,
where Ri,t is the excess return in month t on either the long leg, the short leg, or the
diﬀerence, and St is the level of the investor-sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler
(2006). Also reported are returns on a strategy that equally combines the strategies
available within a given month. The sample period is from 1965:8 to 2008:1 for all
but anomaly (1), whose data begin 1974:12, and anomalies (2) and (10), whose
data begin 1972:1. All t-statistics are based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors of White (1980).
Long Leg Short Leg Long − Short
ˆ b t-stat. ˆ b t-stat. ˆ b t-stat.
Failure probability -0.43 -1.74 -1.80 -2.99 1.37 2.59
Ohlson’s O (distress) -0.24 -0.80 -1.09 -2.31 0.85 2.95
Net stock issues -0.28 -1.38 -0.84 -2.92 0.55 3.93
Comp. equity issues -0.21 -1.12 -0.68 -2.38 0.47 2.68
Total accruals -0.59 -1.82 -0.96 -2.49 0.37 1.77
Net operating assets -0.34 -1.29 -0.83 -2.76 0.49 3.50
Momentum -0.69 -2.38 -1.02 -2.41 0.33 1.07
Gross proﬁtability -0.22 -0.94 -0.54 -2.21 0.32 1.81
Asset growth -0.48 -1.68 -0.91 -2.66 0.44 2.16
Return on assets -0.20 -0.66 -1.14 -2.35 0.94 2.79
Investment/assets -0.70 -2.46 -0.77 -2.51 0.07 0.49
Combination -0.43 -1.85 -0.93 -2.90 0.50 3.79
21Table 5
Investor Sentiment and Anomalies: Predictive Regressions for
Benchmark-Adjusted Returns on Long-Short Strategies
The table reports estimates of b in the regression,
Ri,t = a + bSt−1 + cMKTt + dSMBt + eHMLt + ut,
where Ri,t is the excess return in month t on either the long leg, the short leg, or the
diﬀerence, and St is the level of the investor-sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler
(2006). Also reported are returns on a strategy that equally combines the strategies
available within a given month. The sample period is from 1965:8 to 2008:1 for all
but anomaly (1), whose data begin 1974:12, and anomalies (2) and (10), whose
data begin 1972:1. All t-statistics are based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors of White (1980).
Long Leg Short Leg Long − Short
ˆ b t-stat. ˆ b t-stat. ˆ b t-stat.
Failure probability -0.01 -0.09 -0.92 -2.79 0.91 2.15
Ohlson’s O (distress) 0.07 0.95 -0.52 -2.64 0.59 3.03
Net stock issues 0.01 0.13 -0.38 -3.58 0.39 3.38
Comp. equity issues 0.02 0.29 -0.21 -1.89 0.23 1.77
Total accruals -0.02 -0.12 -0.26 -1.54 0.24 1.21
Net operating assets 0.07 0.72 -0.32 -2.81 0.39 2.86
Momentum -0.04 -0.30 -0.30 -1.11 0.26 0.76
Gross proﬁtability 0.14 1.40 -0.20 -1.62 0.34 1.94
Asset growth 0.06 0.62 -0.35 -2.88 0.41 2.74
Return on assets 0.14 1.44 -0.58 -2.49 0.71 2.67
Investment/assets -0.21 -2.07 -0.24 -2.22 0.03 0.22
Combination 0.00 0.15 -0.32 -3.01 0.32 2.98
22Table 6
Sentiment and Anomalies, Controlling for Additional Macro Variables: Predictive
Regressions for Benchmark-Adjusted Returns on Long-Short Strategies
The table reports estimates of b in the regression,




where Ri,t is the excess return in month t on either the long leg, the short leg, or the
diﬀerence, St is the level of the Baker-Wurgler sentiment index, and X1,t,...,X5,t
are ﬁve additional macro variables not used by Baker and Wurgler (2006) when
removing macro-related ﬂuctuations in sentiment: the default premium, the term
premium, the real interest rate, inﬂation, and CAY. (Baker and Wurgler use the
growth in industrial production, the growth in durable, nondurable, and services
consumption, the growth in employment, and a ﬂag for NBER recessions.) Also
reported are returns on a strategy that equally combines the strategies available
within a given month. The sample period is from 1965:8 to 2008:1 for all but
anomaly (1), whose data begin 1974:12, and anomalies (2) and (10), whose data
begin 1972:1. All t-statistics are based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors of White (1980).
Long Leg Short Leg Long − Short
ˆ b t-stat. ˆ b t-stat. ˆ b t-stat.
Failure probability 0.05 0.28 -1.17 -2.97 1.22 2.39
Ohlson’s O (distress) 0.07 0.79 -0.52 -2.04 0.58 2.33
Net stock issues 0.02 0.26 -0.44 -3.61 0.46 3.46
Comp. equity issues 0.04 0.43 -0.20 -1.82 0.23 1.73
Total accruals 0.06 0.33 -0.30 -1.49 0.35 1.52
Net operating assets 0.05 0.44 -0.34 -2.61 0.39 2.47
Momentum 0.01 0.05 -0.22 -0.72 0.22 0.58
Gross proﬁtability 0.09 0.83 -0.27 -1.93 0.36 1.86
Asset growth -0.05 -0.46 -0.35 -2.50 0.30 1.81
Return on assets 0.06 0.59 -0.89 -3.24 0.95 3.01
Investment/assets -0.28 -2.65 -0.27 -2.23 -0.02 -0.15
Combination -0.01 -0.22 -0.35 -2.86 0.34 2.68
23Table 7
Michigan Sentiment Index and Anomalies: Predictive Regressions
for Benchmark-Adjusted Returns on Long-Short Strategies
The table reports estimates of b in the regression,
Ri,t = a + bSt−1 + cMKTt + dSMBt + eHMLt + ut,
where Ri,t is the excess return in month t on either the long leg, the short leg, or
the diﬀerence, and St is the level of the Michigan sentiment index. Also reported
are returns on a strategy that equally combines the strategies available within a
given month. The sample period is from 1965:8 to 2008:1 for all but anomaly (1),
whose data begin 1974:12, and anomalies (2) and (10), whose data begin 1972:1. All
t-statistics are based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of White
(1980).
Long Leg Short Leg Long − Short
ˆ b t-stat. ˆ b t-stat. ˆ b t-stat.
Failure probability 0.23 1.65 -0.45 -1.66 0.68 2.10
Ohlson’s O (distress) 0.03 0.52 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.16
Net stock issues 0.07 1.12 -0.36 -2.93 0.43 3.60
Comp. equity issues -0.06 -0.68 -0.21 -1.69 0.16 1.03
Total accruals 0.02 0.14 -0.39 -2.24 0.41 2.03
Net operating assets 0.06 0.53 -0.41 -3.23 0.47 2.82
Momentum 0.11 0.71 -0.32 -1.15 0.42 1.13
Gross proﬁtability 0.35 2.98 -0.08 -0.66 0.44 2.39
Asset growth -0.23 -1.82 -0.38 -2.75 0.15 0.78
Return on assets 0.13 1.50 0.07 0.28 0.07 0.25
Investment/assets -0.20 -1.72 -0.23 -1.84 0.03 0.23
Combination 0.06 1.40 -0.27 -2.68 0.33 3.00
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28Table A1
Anomalies During Periods of High and Low Investor Sentiment:
CAPM-Adjusted Returns on Long-Short Strategies
The table reports average CAPM-adjusted returns following high and low levels of investor sentiment, as
classiﬁed based on the median level of the index of Baker and Wurgler (2006). The average returns in high-
and low-sentiment periods are estimates of aH and aL in the regression,
Ri,t = aHdH,t + aLdL,t + bMKTt + ￿i,t,
where dH,t and dL,t are dummy variables indicating high- and low-sentiment periods, and Ri,t is the excess
return in month t on either the long leg, the short leg, or the diﬀerence. Also reported are returns on a
strategy that equally combines the strategies available within a given month. The sample period is from
1965:8 to 2008:1 for all but anomaly (1), whose data begin 1974:12, and anomalies (2) and (10), whose data
begin 1972:1. All t-statistics are based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of White (1980).
Long Leg Short Leg Long − Short
High Low High High Low High High Low High
Sent. Sent. −Low Sent. Sent. −Low Sent. Sent. −Low
Failure probability 0.38 0.26 0.12 -1.74 -0.23 -1.51 2.12 0.49 1.63
(2.24) (1.86) (0.57) (-3.69) (-0.65) (-2.61) (3.95) (1.17) (2.47)
Ohlson’s O (distress) 0.10 -0.08 0.19 -1.40 -0.31 -1.08 1.50 0.23 1.27
(0.95) (-0.88) (1.30) (-4.10) (-1.17) (-2.47) (4.34) (0.73) (2.71)
Net stock issues 0.40 0.18 0.22 -0.81 -0.09 -0.72 1.20 0.27 0.94
(4.13) (2.59) (1.85) (-5.24) (-0.79) (-3.78) (6.63) (2.00) (4.20)
Comp. equity issues 0.32 0.23 0.09 -0.60 -0.05 -0.55 0.92 0.28 0.64
(2.22) (1.97) (0.46) (-3.56) (-0.43) (-2.71) (4.14) (1.76) (2.34)
Total accruals 0.03 0.30 -0.27 -0.96 -0.06 -0.90 0.99 0.36 0.63
(0.14) (1.78) (-0.93) (-3.60) (-0.34) (-2.76) (3.43) (1.63) (1.73)
Net operating assets 0.20 0.24 -0.04 -0.90 -0.07 -0.83 1.10 0.31 0.79
(1.24) (1.98) (-0.21) (-5.41) (-0.55) (-3.98) (4.94) (1.73) (2.75)
Momentum 0.44 0.64 -0.19 -1.63 -0.57 -1.06 2.08 1.21 0.87
(2.01) (3.30) (-0.65) (-4.47) (-2.24) (-2.36) (4.64) (3.56) (1.53)
Gross proﬁtability 0.33 0.19 0.14 -0.32 0.05 -0.36 0.64 0.14 0.50
(2.29) (1.34) (0.70) (-1.97) (0.32) (-1.70) (2.90) (0.60) (1.55)
Asset growth 0.49 0.51 -0.02 -0.96 -0.16 -0.79 1.45 0.68 0.77
(2.66) (2.48) (-0.09) (-5.41) (-1.20) (-3.57) (5.56) (2.91) (2.23)
Return on assets 0.29 -0.05 0.34 -1.52 -0.48 -1.04 1.81 0.43 1.38
(2.07) (-0.34) (1.71) (-3.88) (-1.72) (-2.17) (4.41) (1.30) (2.63)
Investment/assets 0.14 0.68 -0.55 -0.80 -0.00 -0.80 0.94 0.68 0.26
(0.88) (4.19) (-2.41) (-5.03) (-0.01) (-3.70) (4.75) (3.30) (0.91)
Combination 0.28 0.30 -0.02 -1.03 -0.16 -0.86 1.30 0.46 0.84
(4.82) (5.56) (-0.27) (-6.36) (-1.40) (-4.38) (7.87) (4.28) (4.33)
29Table A2
Investor Sentiment and Anomalies: Predictive Regressions for
CAPM-Adjusted Returns on Long-Short Strategies
The table reports estimates of b in the regression,
Ri,t = a + bSt−1 + cMKTt + ut,
where Ri,t is the excess return in month t on either the long leg, the short leg, or the
diﬀerence, and St is the level of the investor-sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler
(2006). Also reported are returns on a strategy that equally combines the strategies
available within a given month. The sample period is from 1965:8 to 2008:1 for all
but anomaly (1), whose data begin 1974:12, and anomalies (2) and (10), whose
data begin 1972:1. All t-statistics are based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors of White (1980).
Long Leg Short Leg Long − Short
ˆ b t-stat. ˆ b t-stat. ˆ b t-stat.
Failure probability -0.03 -0.19 -1.14 -3.01 1.11 2.39
Ohlson’s O (distress) 0.04 0.42 -0.72 -2.79 0.76 2.84
Net stock issues 0.06 1.07 -0.40 -3.95 0.47 3.84
Comp. equity issues 0.08 0.88 -0.24 -2.22 0.32 2.25
Total accruals -0.12 -0.75 -0.42 -2.17 0.29 1.47
Net operating assets 0.07 0.69 -0.38 -3.41 0.45 3.34
Momentum -0.21 -1.56 -0.48 -1.79 0.26 0.85
Gross proﬁtability 0.14 1.34 -0.19 -1.55 0.33 1.85
Asset growth -0.05 -0.37 -0.41 -3.23 0.36 1.89
Return on assets 0.08 0.80 -0.78 -2.77 0.86 2.72
Investment/assets -0.29 -2.28 -0.30 -2.82 0.02 0.14
Combination -0.03 -0.83 -0.44 -3.76 0.41 3.68
30